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CREATIVITY AND CONTROL: 
PROPERTY IN GUIANESE AMAZONIA 
Marc BRIGHTMAN * 
This article introduces the anthropology of propcrty relations to indigenous Amazonia, 
where property has long been assumed to be absent, and shows that focusing on 
Amazonian forms of property can lead to greater understanding of native practices and 
institutions. The article begins by showing that the Trio, \Vayana and Akuriyo of 
southern Suriname have a wide range of practices and values which can usefully be 
understood in terms of property. This provides the basis for a discussion of the 
analytical importance of the anthropology of property for Amazonia, followed by a 
consideration of the place of Amazonian forms of property in the context of anthro-
pological theory. [Key words: Akuriyo, Amazonia, control, creativity, leadership, mate-
rial culture, ownership, property, Suriname, Trio, Wayana.] 
CréatÎl'Îté et contrôle: la propriété en Amazonie guyanaise. Cet article traite de l'anthro-
pologie des relations de propriété en Amazonie indigène. Alors que, dans cette région, 
le concept de« propriété » a été longtemps considéré comme absent, nous démontrons 
ici qu'en s'interrogeant sur les formes amazoniennes de propriété, il est possible 
d'atteindre une meilleure compréhension des pratiques et des institutions indigènes. On 
s'attachera, tout d'abord, à montrer que les Trio, les \Vayana et les Akuriyo du sud 
du Suriname possèdent une large palette de pratiques et de valeurs qui peuvent être 
comprises en termes de propriété. C'est sur cette base que l'on peut entamer une 
discussion sur l'importance analytique de l'anthropologie de la propriété pour I' Ama-
zonie et repenser la place que les formes amazoniennes de propriété prennent dans le 
contexte des théories anthropologiques. [Mots-clés: Akuriyo, Amazonie, contrôle, 
créativité, leadership, culture matérielle, ownership, propriété, Suriname, Trio, \Vayana.] 
CreatMdad y control: la propiedad en la A111azo11fa g11aya11esa. Este articula trata de la 
antropologia de las relaciones de propiedad en la Amazonia indigena, regi6n donde la 
propiedad ha sido desde hace mucho tiempo presentada como ausentc. Demostramos 
aqui que las formas de propiedad existeutes en la Amazonia permiten una mayor 
comprensi6n de las practicas e instituciones indigenas. Empezamos demostrando que 
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los ti rios, los wayanas y los akuriyos del sur de Surinam poseen una gran variedad de 
practicas y valores que pueden ser considerados en términos de propiedad. Esta parte 
descriptiva pcrmite que se discuta la importancia analitica de la antropologia de la 
propiedad en el estudio de esta regi6n y nos ll eva a concebir el lugar de las formas 
amaz6nicas de propiedad en el contexto de la teoria antropo16gica. (Palabras claves: 
akuriyo, Amazonia, control, creatividad, liderazgo, cultura material, ownersliip, 
propicdad, Suri nam, tiri o, wayana.] 
I NTRODUCTION 
The idea of property is one of the fundamenta l elements o f much political 
and social theory (Ryan 1986) 1. There has recently been a resurgencc of anthro-
pological interest in property (e.g. Hann 1998; Hirsch and Strathern 2004; 
Verdery and Humphrey 2004; Brown 1998, 2003; Kalinoe and Leach 2004; 
Moulu 2004; Posey 2004; Strathern 1999; Widlok and Tadesse 2006), to which 
Amazonianist anthropology has so far made virtually no significant contribu-
tion 2. This follows a tradition of Amazonian societies, even more than those of 
the rest of the Americas, being treated as though property were an institution 
alien to them 3. Even within anthropology, there has as yet been no serious 
attempt to understand what kinds of Amerindian concepts might correspond to 
what is unclerstoocl in other traditions as property. In this article I will argue that 
A mazonia n societies not only have forms of property recognisable according to 
widely accepted basic criteria, but that they also present distinctive forms of 
property which a re worthy of anthropological attention. 
When the fir st systematic studies of Amazonian societies began to be made 
around the middle o f the 20th century, some authors included brief sections on 
property. Fock dedicates nearly two pages to property in his monograph on the 
Waiwai: he notes that men, women and children have « personal rights of 
property »; that a father « owns » la rger objects used by the whole family, such as 
a canoe, and that personal property may be bartered using a n oho chanting 
ceremony; that fi elds, or specifi c portions of fields, a re« owned » by individuals 
(Fock 1963, pp. 205-206). For the Cubeo of Northwest Amazonia, Goldma n 
( 1963, p. 71) gives rather more detail, aftirming that « [w]ith respect to land it is 
dominion rather tha n ownership that we deal with », but that chagra gardens a re 
a « well -defined item of property » and « the domain of a particular woman »; 
other types of cultivation belong to the culti vator while « the land on which they 
are grown has no standing as persona! property » (ibid. , p. 74; we shall see that 
there are parallels here with the Trio). Parts o f the ri ver a re also staked out by 
men. Certain kinds of objects (thosc made for public use) are owned coll ecti vely 
by the community; other objects are owned individuall y. Golclman (ibid., p. 75) 
a lso makes the suggestive observation that « possessions confer huma n status. 
T hat is, a person should own things ». M any authors refer to property only as a 
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synonym for moveable objects (e.g. Maybury-Lewis 1974; Rivière 1969); none 
interrogates the nature of property as understood by natives, and ail appear to 
assume that property rights are unproblematic. A notable exception to this 
trend is Gregor, who notes the distinctiveness and complexity of possessives in 
Mehinaku grammar and underlines the relationship between property and per-
sonhood (« [t]he Mehinaku interest in ownership is ... built right into the structure 
of their language »), owned abjects being more or Jess closely associated with 
individuals (a fact expressed in the possessive forms of nouns) ; he also makes 
thoughtful observations on the role of scarcity as a measure of value, taking this 
as a point of comparison with « our own society »(Gregor 1977, pp. 120-121). 
lt is only very recently that this potentially rich line of inquiry has been revisited, 
notably by Costa (2010 in this issue, 2007), who shows the relationship between 
Kanamari personhood, leadership and ownership, and Fausto (2008a, 2008b), 
who argues for the all-embracing importance of relationships of« mastership » 
in native Amazonian social and cosmological relations. 1 became aware of the 
work of Fausto and Costa only after having developed the basic argument 
presented here, and the fact that we independently decided that it was time to 
argue for the importance of native property relations in Amazonia testifies to the 
strong foundations of the case. 
It therefore seems ail the more justifiable to place the evidence presentecl here 
in the context of the wider literature on the anthropology of property. However, 
I prefer to avoid a « top-down » approach to this subject such as that taken by 
Testait (2003), which imposes a European notion of property against which 
incligenous institutions are measured. As Neale (1998) has pointed out, Western 
ideas about property are« ideologically and historically specific »,and empirical 
stucly is necessary to « discover and report rules of access before, not after, we 
invent universal concepts of property »(ibid., p. 57). Treatingjural definitions of 
property from capitalist states as a gold standard (instead of a special case) risks 
giving rise to an ethnocentric analysis with limited anthropological value 4 . 
lnstead, l will attempt to follow Rivière's (1993) cal! for an« amerindianisation » 
of key anthropological concepts, using a « bottom-up » approach (see Santos 
Granero 2009) to outline the distinctively Amazonian forms of property. 
To facilitate this approach, I will begin by presenting the forms of property found 
among the Trio and their neighbours of southern Suriname. J will then discuss 
property in the broader context of Amazonia. Finally, I will consider the 
Amazonian case against the wider anthropological iterature on property. 
POSSESSION AMONG THE TRIO 
The Trio, and the neighbouring (and in certain cases intermarrying) Akuriyo 
and Wayana, a re swidden horticulturalist hunter-gatherers of the terra firme 
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uplands of the Guiana shield, most of whom have corne from interfluvial areas to 
li ve in large vill ages that have grown up around missionary airstrips created on the 
banks of la rger ri vers in the last 50 years. T heir transactions of objects and 
persons have corne to involve cash purchase alongside sharing, barter and gift 
exchange, and transactions often li e mid-way between such categories. 
There are three principal « types of possession » in the Trio language, defined, 
no t by alienability/inalienabilit y (a distinction of importance in many languages), 
but rather along « temporal parameters », which the Jinguist Carlin (2004, 
pp. 459-476) characteri zes as: « inunediate possession », « temporary controlled 
possession», and« permanent possession » 5. 
The fir st type, for which Carlin gives the example of karakuri 11ai jill'ei11je, 
« I have money on me », as it deals with immediate possession, may not seem to 
be relevant to the notion of property, because if, for example, one does not have 
money on one's person, but in another place, then it is used in the negati ve. 
However, this impression may be due merely to a narrower definition of property 
than any we are used to. Yet even Adam Smith, while contributing to founding 
modern notions of property, conjectured that among huniers, because of their 
nomadic lifestyle, « the notion of property seems ... to have been confined to what 
was about ones person » (Smith 1978, p. 485). Whether or not it is universal 
among nomadic hunting societies for immediate possession to be the primary 
notion of property, the suggestion does carry some resonance in the Guianas, and 
Akuriyo do tend to carry their most treasured possessions on their persons; it is 
worth noting that these a re the items with which they would be Jeast likely to part, 
and thus the immediacy o f this fonn of possession has no relationship to the level 
of ali enability of the objects concerned. 
It is equall y signifi cant that the second fonn, temporary controlled 
possession, is characterised by control rather th an ali enability. Carlin 's example is 
111aja e11t11111e l!'ae, « I have a knife [that J can give away] ». The word e11t11 has no 
direct equivalent in Engli sh, but it carries the sense of both « owner » and 
« boss ».The Portuguese do110 or Spanish d11e1îo would be closer translations (see 
Fausto 2008b). It also means « trunk of tree » and «foot of mountain ». The 
leader or foundcr of a village is known as the pata e11111, lit erall y the « place 
en tu » 6, and persons in charge of particular tasks, such as running the generator 
or the radio, are known as the 111011/om en tu and the radio e11111 respectively. This 
is despite the fact that legally the radio in Tëpu, the village in which I carried out 
the majority of my field research, is the property of the telecommunications 
company, Telesur, and the generator that of the Mini stry of Social Affa irs. The 
common factor uniting these examples of e11t11 is the practical element of being in 
charge of, being responsible for, and carrying out or delegating tasks related to 
the village, radio or generator. The sufli x -111e, here meaning « being in astate of», 
gives e11t11111e. E11t11111e wae means « 1 have it », usually with a sense of control, and 
also implying an idea of mastery over a thing (sce Fausto 2008a, 2008b): it can be 
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used of objects that can be exchanged (bateri e11t11111e wae, « T have batteries [to 
give away] »; 111alaja e11t11111e 111a11a11?, «do you have a machete [for me]?»). Carlin 
does not comment on the fact that this expression may also be used to refer to 
features of one's own body: one man, for example, once used it to point out tome 
that he had a pierced septum, in contrast with another person who did not. Once 
again, this is because of the element of control - but also because of the transient 
nature of the body according to indigenous cosmology; although the man cannot 
« unpierce »bis septum or give it away, and the piercing seems to be permanent, 
the humanity and integrity of the body must constantly be maintained by 
artificial means. It is also worth adding that the notion of ownership/control also 
carries an important sense of knowledge: to know something is synonymous with 
owning and controlling it. 
A possessor in this type of construction must be animate, and X e11t11111e wae 
means « I own/control X ».The question, karakuri e11111111e 111a11a11?, «do you have 
money », implies a request for money, because it includes the suggestion« do you 
have enough money? », or « money to spare », or « do you have control of the 
money [such that you can give me some]? ». Exchange, or giving, and control are 
united in this linguistic feature, and this is a crucial point to bear in mind to 
understand Trio notions of property. Although property relations of this type are 
transient, they are soin the sense that they imply the power to change: a village 
leader's position is subject to his maintaining certain relationships with his pëito 
(subordinates/sons-in-law) or villagers, who may desert him at any time; yet he 
has control of the village and represents it (in ways discussed below). 
The emphasis on control highlights the political character of e11t11 possession, 
and to understand this it is worth noting that, at least among kin, sharing is the 
predominant way in which things change bands; Guianese people obtain things 
from kin by demanding them, and greatly disapprove of« stinginess », just as in 
the « sharing » economies of many hunter-gatherers (Woodburn 1998). In view 
of this, however, we may wonder how people are able to maintain possession of 
the valuable industrially produced prestige goods that they often acquire now-
adays. In fact they frequently do obtain such items by demancling them from 
wealthy outsiders (missionaries and NGO or government workers). Amerindian 
owners of such valuable and prestigious items are very unwilling to part with 
them, and this causes social tensions that would have been less acute in the past, 
when access to resources depended less upon client relationships with outsiders. 
However this change should also be seen in the context of the transition that has 
occurred between the small, largely enclogamous and relatively short-lived settle-
ments of the past (see Rivière 1984) and the large, permanent settlements that 
have grown up in recent decades around mission stations, in which affines live in 
close proximity and regularly internet. 
Sharing is of central importance to leadership, and consequently persona! 
influence often usecl to be inversely proportional to wealth, although this bas 
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changed now that leaders' positions are more secure due to the official state 
sanction of leaders as « captains », and to the presence of schools and clinics 
which reduce the likelihood of political factions departing. Even so, one of the 
two « captains »in Tëpu gives vas! quantities of goods to his demanding father-
in-law and to other close relatives of his. He is constantl y in financial debt, and 
has developed a reputation for bouncing cheques. Lévi-Strauss (1944, p. 24) 
called the leader's need to give in response to the demands of his followers the 
« fir st instrumental force » of the chiers power. I would add that the leader also 
has to accumulatc more in order to sustain his giving, necessitating and 
facilitating his greater social connectedness. 
Sharing relationships, meanwhile, tend to be expressed as « permanent » 
possession, of which Carlin 's examples are: « "I have a father [tij1apake wae ], a 
sister", or " I have a ho use [ tïpakoroke wae ]" »(Carlin 2004, p. 459). This type of 
construction describes astate, in these examples roughly corresponding to being 
« be-fathered », « be-sistered », or « housed », and it does not imply any trans-
action. A permanent posscssor does not have to be animate, and so features 
of abjects or places can be describcd in this way. With regard to things as opposed 
to persons, whether they are described in tenns of permanent or temporary 
possession depends upon context. ln the case of « hammock », the noun 
itself changes from ëhke (permanent) to weitapi (temporary) to ernphasize this 
distinction: tëhkeke 111a11a11? «do you have a hamrnock » (lit. «are you be-
hammocked? »); ll'eitapi e11t11111e 111a11a11? «do you have a [spare] hamrnock [that 1 
canuse/bu y]?». This is because hammocks can be made for tracte or for persona! 
use, and once they are appropriated in the latter case, they are permanent 
property and will not normally be parted with. 
The anirnate or inanimate nature of the subject in possessive constructions 
is signifi cant. Temporary controlled possession must have an animale subject. 
This supports the hypothesis that it is action or practice that makes property. 
Sorne kind of action - either through exchange or through the manipulation 
of materials in the forest or garden - must be taken in order to have a ternpo-
rary controll ed possessed object, and this requires a n animale subject. In more 
general terms, whereas ternporary possession is concerned with the thing 
possesed, permanent possession is concerned with a status or an identity, 
although both forms concern relations of one kind or another. Moreover, it is 
worth noting here that the « permanence » of permanent possession is only 
relati ve, and ki nship relations also require constant upkeep tluough interactions 
of various kinds, espcciall y eating and d rinking together. A vi ll age leader more 
clearly owes his positi on not to an innate status, but to his fo undation of a vill age 
and his actions (cspecially acquiring and giving objects) and speeches; it is 
these relationships and actions themselvcs that are described in terrns of penna-
nent possession; thus once again we fi nd a certain continuity between ownership 
and political influence. 
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While the distinction between « permanent »and other forms of possession 
li es in the extent to which persan and abject (or persan and persan, etc.) are 
bound up wi th each other, immediate possession distinguishes itself from the 
other fonm by the concreteness of the property relationship. This corresponds to 
the Tri o's emphasis in thcir la nguage upon distinguishing the seen from the 
unseen, and the certain from the uncertain . One may be the owner of an item, but 
this is not the same as having it in one's grasp. Experience, relationship and 
intention are ail thus mobili zed even in the most everyday possessive construc-
tions. This suggests it is inappropriate to discuss property in absolute tenns. 
I have introduced Trio possessive constructions in order to give a basic idea of 
how they refer to owncrship and possession. However, the relationship between 
la nguage and thought is problematic, and that between Janguage and society is no 
Jess so: at best one must all ow for the fact that if social practices and modes of 
thought fin d expression in linguistic constructions, these three things may not 
cha nge at the same pace, and the relati onship of causalit y between the three is 
diffi cult to establish. 1 therefore wish to avoid a more detailed discussion o f the 
constructions presented above, as my objecti ve here is to considcr practices of 
ownership. It would be a mistake to offer the impression that possesive construc-
tions can be taken simply and directl y for categories of property. Instead, these 
constructions should provide a linguistic background to the concrete practices 
that 1 will now discuss. 
LAN O: TRANSFORi\IATION OF THE ENVIRONi\fENT 
The most politi call y signi ficant kind of property relations, in Amazonia as 
elsewhere, are perhaps those concerning the euvironment. Among the Trio, 
as I will show, it is clear that land used as gardens can be called property based on 
the cri teria of 11s11,.fmct11s and ab11s11s (see Testart 2003). H owever, what consti-
tutes these things is rather more complex, as is the set of relations that compose 
sovereign territory. M oreover, Trio modes of being and of interacting with the 
environment challenge the distinctions that these classical criteria arc based on, 
and others impli cit in Western distinctions between different kinds of property, 
especiall y bctween material and immaterial property, or between physical and 
intell ectual property. 
T he Trio's relationship with the non-human environ ment resembles the« sen-
tient ccology » of the Evenki (A nderson 1998) a nd their relationship with the 
landscape involves ncgoti ations with non-human persans and inunersion in 
histories of « wayfaring » (Ingold 2000; see Merleau-Ponty 1945; Lévi-Strauss 
1962; Descola 1986). In Trio, location is expressed by suffi x in one of five ways, 
distinguishing open space (pata-po, in the vill age), enclosed space (it11-tao, in the 
forest), in li quid (t1111a-hkao, in the water/ river), in tire (111ahto-re11ao), or in 
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contact (i111-pë, on the branch) (Carlin 2004, p. 172). The qualitative difference 
between types of spacc is most important between the village and the forest, space 
being subjectively experienced, either from within the forest o r « at »a place or 
village. Rivière has rightly drawn attention to the strong cosmological distinction 
between it11 and pata, the latter meaning « village »or « place», and i/11 meaning 
« fores! »or « without a place ». However, rather than seeing the village as simply 
surrounded by forest, there is a further sense in which « place» includes hmnan 
paths through the forest: if « place» corresponds to a network of histories, then 
it11 is the holes in the net. Rather than call it « without a place», it is useful to 
think of the fores! as «non-place», to highlight its character of altcrity and 
non-identity. lts alterity is not so mucha characteristic of the fores! itself as of il s 
non-human inhabitanls: plants, animais and spirits. Human relationships with 
these are part of a« sen tient ecology »(Anderson 1998) which can be understood 
in terms of property relations in ways discussed below. 
The artificial, the made, and the social are, on the other hand, clearly 
« owned » in some way or other almost by definition 7. Culti vated land becomes 
« somebody's »garden; a basket becomes the prnperty of its maker or a person to 
whom he gives it , until it begins to rot or fall a pari, and it is left to the ll'ii'ïp ëlitao 
(T), the liminal frin ge of the village where rubbish is thrnwn Io return to the 
fores!. This distinction between inside and outside has politi cal dimensions which 
Menget (1993, p. 60) has suggested constitute the very definilion of a polity. 
Place-making, like human relationships, depends on the domestication of space; 
ownership of land is the sa me as culti vai ion of land, which is the expression of the 
historical relationship of a person or group to a place. But Amerindian polities 
and places are not qui te so clearly identifiable; nor do they correspond precisely 
to each other. 
1111 represents a category that cannot be owned as such. But there is a sense in 
which areas of forest belong under the political sovereignty of a village. This 
appears clearly in the history of Tri o relationships with gold prnspectors. For a 
period during the l 990s, the captain of Tëpu tolerated the presence of Brazilian 
goldminers in the forest within the sphere of influence of the village, in return for 
payment in gold. Aft er becoming worried about the undesirable consequences of 
their presence, such as alcohol and clrug abuse, and mercury pollution, he 
changed his minci and told them that they were no longer welcome; they duly left 
and have not returnecl since. There are cases in which the sovereignty of a local 
leader is not respected in this way, such as on the Lawa and Litani on the southern 
reaches of the border between French Guiana and Suriname. Here, gold pros-
pecting is mo re intense and the situation more complex. Some Wayana leaders 
con test the presence of gokl prnspectors, whereas others collaborale with them in 
return for remunerati on. Meanwhile, the involvement of M arnons makes gold 
prospecting an additional factor in a long history of territorial ri valry between 
Marnons and Wayana. 
142 
Brightman PROPERTY IN GUIANESE AMAZONIA 
In both situations, one principal remains constant: when gold prospectors are 
allowed to work within the sphere of political influence of a Trio or Wayana 
village, they are conceded usufruct, but must paya fonn of rent or compensation 
(refusai to do so is seen by the local leader as an affront). The land that they use 
does not ipso facto become their property, and the local leader can, in principal, 
demand that they leave. This is clearly quite difTerent from the case of ordinary 
Amerindian land use for cultivation, in which a garden is the property of its 
creator. Does the possibility of conceding land temporarily to the Other, to 
non-Trio and non-Amerindians, constitute a new fonn of property relation? 
White this might be so, it seems likely that it does not affect the logic of Trio 
propcrty relations, but rather the changes in relations with alterity that have 
occurred through pacification, sedentarisation and evangelisation. In the past, 
enemy groups who tried to appropriate land for gardens and settlements on land 
considered by a given group of Trio to be their territory would not simply have 
been given property rights to the places concerned by virtue of their trans-
formation of the environment. They would either have been attacked and killed 
or expelled, or friendly relations would have been cstablished, eventually to 
convert them into kin; however neighbouring groups would be unlikely to try to 
establish gardcns or villages on each other's territory without first establishing 
friendly relations and (as this usually implies) intermarrying 8. In view of ail 
this, we can affirm that for the Trio sovereign territory can be distinguished 
from place and property. Terri tory and place can be thought of as potential and 
actual property respectively. 
In some respects the above argument echoes the labour theory of property, 
the enclosure of the commons in European history, and of the legal justifica-
tion for colonialism that only cultivated land constituted owned land, making 
clearing, ploughing and sowing tantamount to a legitimate claim (see Locke 
1988; Rousseau 1992; Smith 1978). This underlines the common element to ail 
fonns of property - that is, narrative, or history. It is events, and the history 
of a relationship, that make people belong to each other, and things or land 
belong to people; and the narratives of those events can turn them into pro-
perty. To take possession of something can create ownership. In French 
Guiana, as in many Amazonian states, the state still allows individuals to 
« stake » a claim to a piece of land by enclosing, clearing and cultivating it 9. 
The Western practice of « staking » claims may seem to suggest a diftèrence 
bctween this cornerstone of colonial appropriation and the apparent idiosyncra-
sies of indigenous Amazonian culture: ambiguity and change or impermanence, 
lcading to the need for constant renewal of ownership, are vital parts of Amer-
indian property relations, whereas Western property relations appear to strive to 
eliminate ambiguity and achieve permanence. But in fact the diftèrence is not so 
clear. Native Amazonian property relations also involve constantly striving to 
perpetuate ownership in the face of the constant threat of transformation of 
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status and relation, and Western property relations also emphasise that use is a 
necessary condition for the continuation of ownership: for instance in French 
Guiana « staked » claims are« renewable » every five years as long as they 
continue to be culti vated 10• 
Sovereign terri tory in the Guianas, from an indigenous perspective, is defined 
by the activities of the people who huut, fi sh and cultivate there. But if creativit y 
begets property, this does not necessaril y meau that people produce territory, 
rather than the other way around. The situation is more ambiguous: for example, 
there is some indication in this region of the existence of ancestral places and of 
territoria l emergence sites. The mountain call ed t11k11sipa11 can be regarded as an 
a rchetype of the Wayana house, and paima11, the Trio word for a large communal 
house, is also the na me of a mountain. Moreover the Trio associate their ancestry 
with the savannah area call ed Samuwaka, south of Tëpu on the Brazilian side of 
the watcrshed. However this has littl c impact on the practicalities of residence or 
cultivation 11 • Rather than either land or people being prior to the other, there is 
a complementa ry and mutually constituting relationship between the two, in the 
sense that lngold (2000) argues is also typical of circumpolar societies. 
In practica l tenns, with regard to contemporary land claims, in the Guianas, 
it is only with the emerging possibility (and nccessity) of formai, state-legislated 
land claims that the notion of entitlement has become relevant 12• Notions of 
ancestry, descent and lineage, which ordinarily play littl e rolc in indigenous 
Guianese kinship 13 and almost none in the relationship towards the land, 
become mobilized as part of strategies to retain land under pressure 14• T here is a 
key general point to be taken from this: property rights, as exclusive ownership, 
are only necessary where there is competition; or, as Hume ( 1975) argued, such 
property rights only make sense when they a re in the interests of society. J suggest 
that the noti on of creativit y, which Strathern employs to show how land 
ownership can be simil ar to intell ectua l property, is even more important in the 
Guianas, because not even the group's relationship towards the land can be taken 
for granted. Only social relati onships are emphasised, and gardens themselves, 
which can belong to individuals, must be created from the forest by transforming 
the places of non-human persons 15• 
The fo rest is associatecl wi th the spiritual realm, and belongs to shamans in 
the sense that it is their sphere of influence, and it is « proper » to them: ordinary 
people claim ignorance of it , whereas shamans « have »spirit familiars which a re 
exclusive to them and, as with other forms of property, these must be actively 
maintained (by feeding with tobacco smoke); this of course is a fragile and 
impermanent fonn of property, being located in a shifting and uncertain dimen-
sion. The spatial organisation of spirit s is a lso a fonn of belonging, and it is 
expressed in the narrative arti culation of the forest. This spatia l dimension of the 
spirit worlcl has important implications for perspectivist theory, which tends to 
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focus on abstract relations without taking into account the effects of time on the 
spatial organisation of humanity and alterit y. Spirit s belong to particula r places 
(or the places belong to them), whether because they are the homes of the masters 
of anima is, or because they are old vill ages, as a result of the histories of those 
places. Evangelica l missionaries regarded this as a central problem when they 
were attempting to convince the Trio and Wayana of the superiorit y of their 
reli gion, and mounted expcditions to go to the « great jaguar's vill age» or the 
« great deer's village» to « demonstrate » that there was no danger in going there. 
A place of historical and spiritual importance is one in which an important 
transformation has taken place, or in which a highly transformable bcing dwell s, 
and part of the danger of such places is that furt her t ransformations, beyond the 
control of Trio and Wayana people, rnay take p lace there in the future. 
T he« masters »of anima l species, such as the« great »jagua r and deer mentioned 
above, a re those which can transform themselves into proto-humans, and which 
control the provision of game animais. Trio also avoid old vill ages because of the 
presence of dead people's spirits, who, lacking bodies, and therefore lacking 
human perspectives, will try to usurp the bodies of those who come near. ln the 
case of these spirit places, which a re given na mes although they exist in the fores!, 
naming marks them as non-human property, and excludes them from the 
arti ficial processes (clearing and building or planting) that would appropriate 
them as human property. 
T hus, even if the forest is « non-place», this does not make it terra 11111/ius; it 
is not empty « space », but is instead the place of alterit y. The transformation that 
occurs when creating a vill age or garden is the transformation of alterity 
into kinship: clearing and burning, it is hoped, send the spiri ts away, and they 
a re replaced by manioc clones in the garden, which, as persons nurtured as 
though they were kin, a re truly domestic plants; this echoes the « planting » of 
kin in the vill age, and likewise leadership and collective labour permit this creative 
appropriation of social space. 
L EADERSttlP AND VfLLAGE FOUNDATION 
Vill ages are named after, and « belong » to their founders or « owners » 
( e11111) 16• In more general terms, it may be said that p laces belong to, or a re 
owned by, their makers; to create is to own and control. Vill age foundation is thus 
of great importance as a politi cal activi ty (see Menge! 1993, p. 69; Hecken berger 
2005 passim). A Trio man wishing to assert his independence and his leadership 
qualiti es founds a vill age or, as often happens in today's large vill ages centred on 
health and education providers, he founds a new section of a vill age. This involves 
the organization of labour to clear and build, which creates a proprietorial 
relationship of authorit y (where one does not already exist) betwecn a founder 
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and his foll owers; a leader can say « pëito e11t11111e 111ae », « I have (temporary 
controlled) a fo ll ower ». In most cases, vill age foundation invo lves the division of 
a previously exisli ng local group, and therefore constit u tes the creation of a new 
poli ty. For these reasons, it can be regarded as the politi cal act par exce/le11ce: the 
group cames together (i n a parl icular place) around a leader (wbo chooses that 
p lace) 17• Vill ages, li ke houses, are usuall y named after their builder/founders: 
they are biographical enliti es. 
If vill ages are named aft er persans, this does not merely associate them 
with a n individual. T he resonance of a uame should be understood in l ight of the 
fact that, a mong the Trio and Wayana (as among the Iatmul of Papua New 
Guinea), « names contain relationships which people own » (Moulu 2004, 
p. 108). However, na mes do no t have the same exclusive value for the Tri o and 
Wayana as for the Iatmul, and disputes over property are rare; such confli cts a re 
preferably avoided. A lmost every individua l has a unique name, and new names 
are enthusiasticall y adopted from outsiders. Although I was unable to obtain a 
clcar expla nati on of lhis, il is coherent wi th the tendency to bring in persans and 
things from « oulside » to renew and nourish the « inside ». Al the same lime, 
each name refl ects its source, and names a re often adopted with the permission 
o f their origina l ho lder: parents o f a newborn child somelimes ask a non-
Am erindian outsider if they can name the baby after them. T he na me thereafter 
contains the relationship 18• Nam ing a vill age thus leads to the encapsulation o f 
the network of relationships comprising the future residents of the vi ll age in the 
na me of its founder. 
Vill ages in the pasl (i.e. unt il the mid-20th century, when the most intense 
pcriod of evangelisation in this region began) were smaller tha n they a re now 19 , 
a nd many contemporary vi ll ages were no t founded by Amerindians; largely 
because of the attractions they prcsent such as a school, health post and airstrip, 
they have lasted more than a generalion and grown to unprecedented propor-
tions. Yel secti ons o f the vi ll age (which in some cases a re spat iall y qui te distinct 
a nd separate) are themselves referred to as pata. T hey are named, as ail vill ages 
were in the past 20, aft er people rathcr tha n features of the landscape. Thcre 
is a segmcntary logic Io vi ll age naming: when in the cit y, j ipata refers to « m y » 
vill age as a who le, but when in the vill age, jipata refers to « my » section of 
the vill age. The pattern of abandonment and foundati on of sections never theless 
fo ll ows that o f vill ages in the past 2 1. 
Settlement solidarity revolves around the founder of a vill age or vill age 
section, and is based upon his authorit y over his daughters and sons-in-
law. The practice o f dest roying the possessions and oftcn the ho use of the 
deccased used to extend to the entire settlement in the evenl o f the death o f 
it s leader. T his was the occasion for the mig ration o f all the remaini ng 
residents - and often their simultaneous d ispersal as rival new leaders founded 
separate new settlements. Today, numcrous sites on riverbanks are spoken o f as 
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abandoned settlements where a pata e11111 died. Such places are said to be 
infested with spirits, and unsuitable for settlement or cultivation. They can 
be known as « X's old place» or using toponyms. Within today's larger, 
more permanent village, houses and even whole sections may be abandoned 
at titnes for the same reasons, but relocation may take place within the 
larger village. Here the problems with household location tend to be associated 
with the proximity of aflines, rather than with the presence of spirits; although 
both are analogous to each other as they are both examples of the dangers 
attributed to alterity. 
Evangelical missionaries named new villages after features of the landscape as 
part of a strategy to create permanent settlements. By giving neutral names, 
«rock » (Tëpu) or Lawa (the name of a river), and installing a church, a medical 
centre, an airstrip and a school, they created a permanent centre of attraction, a 
nexus of spiritual and material resources, around which smaller, kin-based 
villages (founded in more or less the usual way) cluster. The village of Tëpu is 
often referrecl to as a « white people's village » [Pananakiri ipata (T)] , because il
was founclecl by American and Dutch missionaries 22• « White peoples' villages» 
tend to grow bigger and last longer than traditionally foundecl ones. This is 
because of the desirable external resources that the white people themselves 
bring, inclucling metal goods al first, and later schools and clinics, but it is also 
likely to be because or the diminished need for relocation, because the white 
founders are less likely to die in the village. 
There is a clear relationship between village permanence and its foundation 
by a « White » outsider. Most « permanent » villages appear to have been foun-
ded by outsiders: Tëpu, Kwamalasamutu, Palumeu, and Apalai. Apart from 
the fact that outsiders often create attractions that outlast their own presence 
(clinics, etc.) because they represent larger organizations, I suggest that it is also 
significant that missionaries and other outsiders rarely die in the field , and when 
they do their remains are quickly removed. The fonn of village leadership or 
ownership that they represent is different from that of the Tndians themselves in 
many respects, but the spiritual danger that their death would bring to a village 
never seems to have posed a problem. A large part of the danger of the spirit s of 
the dead stems from their desire to rejoin the social world of their former kin ; 
nou-Amerindians, however long they remain in a village, do not usually become 
socialised in the same way, and rarely marry local people. Missionaries in parti-
cular deliberately main tain a certain aloof distance. The Trio are therefore in no 
danger living in Tëpu, for example, as the main founder returned to the USA long 
ago. Although he is still alive, when news of his death reaches Tëpu, as one day il 
will, il is highly unlikely that people will take any action as a result. This curious 
situation of an absent village founder has allowecl a village to exist indefinitely 
without disturbing traditional property relations. 
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ÜWNERSHlP OF PERSONS A.1'\'D THINGS 
The leader's role as « owner » of the vi ll age also corresponds to a fonn 
of « ownership » or « mastery » over the villagers, his pëito or subordinates. 
The relationship between leader and followers is modelled upon that between 
father-in-law and son-in-law, and is the basic relationship of inequality among 
the Trio (Brightman 2007; see Karadimas 2000). lt takes its strongest fonn in the 
« ownership » of Akuriyo, the remnants of a hunter-gatherer people captured 
during evangelical raids in the late l 960s. The Akuriyo were parcelled out among 
the families of those involved in the expeditions, and today they remain attached 
to the se f amilies. They do not have their own cookhouses, and the y are sent to 
hunt, fetch and carry by their Trio « owners ». Trio refer to « owning » Akuriyo 
( e11111me wae) . This relationship seems close to that of the Waiwai and the 
« unseen peoples » whom they captured and incorporated in a context of evan-
gelical missionary activity (Howard 2001); but the difference is that the Akuriyo 
have not been incorporated by the Trio and have instead remained as subordina-
tes - in Tëpu, the village in which I carried out most of my fieldwork, there were 
no cases of intermarriage. The case thus also recalls the Amerindian slavery 
practices of the more distant past (Santos Granero 2009) and among other 
contemporary peoples such as the Yuqui (David Jabin persona! communication 
2008). I do not have space here to engage in a dctailed comparison of the Akuriyo 
and the appropriation of other, non-human persons; however, it is useful to see 
the case as the strongest possible evidence of the appropriation of persons in a 
supposedly egalitarian Amazonian society (pace Overing and Passes 2000), and it 
seems reasonable to call this ownership of persons a fonn of« slavery ». 
Animais and plants, which are a lso generally considcred as types of « per-
son », are appropriated in similar ways, and plants,« bushmeat » and live animais 
are traded routinely; as I have discussed elsewhere (Brightman 2008a), of these 
three forms of trade, it is those of plants and bushmeat that secm to raise the most 
anxiety about possible repercussions. These repercussions would in theory come 
from the spirit « owners » or masters of the animais or plants concerned . 
Fo r example, when two women died from cancer in the early 1990s, their hus-
bands stopped hunting for the bushmeat trade, becausc they attributed the 
illnesses to the anger caused by their immoderate hunting. ln the case of artefacts, 
it is those who make the artefacts that own them; once again, creativity begets 
ownership. However, objects, like meat and food plants, enter into a cycle of 
transformation and reciprocity; manioc presses, for example, are made by men for 
their wives, who use them to process manioc planted by men and coll ected by 
womeu, and so on. Objects and food are clearly not held in common, and there is 
an important distinction between the demand sharing that is usually practiced 
and common property (o r absence of property). People do not simply belp 
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themselves to the food or objects of other households; they ask for whatever it is 
that they want, and the absence of a monetary value or legal right does not 
detract from a person's prerogative to dispose of their property. 
The disapproval of meanness is characteristic of the Trio's attitude towards 
persons and things as property. Possession and property amount in practice 
almost to the same thing, however, and littl e distinction is made between giving 
and borrowing. Having sa id this, the use of money and the increasing presence of 
long-lasting manufactured items are giving rise to an increasing tendency for 
people to Iock their bouses and secretly board objects. This is in contrast to the 
ostentatious way in which certain prestige items are displayed, such as relatively 
cxpensive clothes, watches and other paraphernalia. These appear not to be 
transferable, and may be regarded as« permanent »extensions of the person who 
wears or carries them 23. 
Sorne objects are clearly gendered, as everywhere in Amazonia: most 
obviously, hunting paraphernalia and fishing tackle belong to men and cooking 
utensil s to women. More interestingly, men vigorously main tain their monopoly 
on any items which involve interactions between non-kin. A good illu stration of 
this is the case of the motorised manioc grater that was brought to Tëpu and first 
put into use white J was there. Manioc grating is women's work, but men 
maintained control of the machine (this was made easier for them by their 
ownership of the fuel). Whenever a group of women wanted to use the machine, 
they would ask permission of il s male« owner », and he would set the machine in 
motion. The women, some of whom paid a small fee (depending on their 
relationship wit h the machine's owner) could then unload their ka tari of manioc 
into the machine. 
The overriding factors in the appreciation and value of ordinary material 
objects tend to be age and usefulness. Old things are generall y regarded as useless, 
and novelty, beauty and desirability are expressed together in the word k11ra110. 
The vast majority of everyday objects are utilitarian: cooking utensil s, manioc 
squeezers, hunting and fi shing equipment - and it makes sense that the newer 
they are, the better condition they are in, and therefore the more valuable. 
The same pattern partly appli es to ritual and ornamental objects, whose value 
may also in a sense be regarded as utilitarian in terms of their functions such as 
protection against spirit attacks, or invigoration of the body. The exceptions to 
this are bead necklaces, feather headdresses, panti waist adornments, keweiju 
bead aprons, and flutes (or parts of flut es) made of bone or claw. These, although 
considered more beautiful when they are new, have greater value precisely 
because of their durability or« hardnes » (T. karime). Glass beads are preferred 
to seeds not just because they are more difli cult to procure, or because they 
require Jess work (seeds must be toasted, pierced and dyed), but primarily because 
of their far greater durability. The history of the beads themselves is given no 
importance, and good quality glass beacls can be recycled when a particular 
149 
JOURNA L DE LA SOCTÉTÉ DES AMBRJCANI STES Vol. 96-1, 2010 
ornament begins to become unstrung; women are forever requesting the parti-
cular colours they need for the design they have in mind. More elaborate feather 
ornaments a re kept, for as long as possible 24 and, a long with other highly valued 
items, may be inherited; shamans in particular passed their rattles (and, more 
importantly, their contents) down to their apprentices (Peter Rivière persona! 
communication 2007) 25. However, many ritual objects are a lso quite disposable. 
The clarinets associated with the Wayana marake initi ation ceremony are made 
especially for the occasion and are discarded afterwards, not because of pollu-
tion, but bccause they have fulfilled their purpose and wi ll no longer be new or 
beautiful ( k11ra110) by the next ceremony. 
Toclay, the value of ceremonial artefacts, particularly the ma/11111a11a, a dise of 
silk cotton wood ( Ceiba pe11ta11dra) painted with images of animais and powerful 
spirit s traditionally displaycd in Wayana roundhouses, is sometimes measured by 
their cash value when they a re made for sale to tourists in the ci ty 26. This suggests 
that the property value of an objcet is not intrinsic to the type of object, but to the 
purpose for which it is made. A 111a/11111a11a is the permanent property or a 
coll ecti vit y, when it is clesigned for il s usual purpose, as a ritual ornament for the 
conununal meeting house ( t11k11sipr111) . When it is made for trade, on the other 
hand, it is referred to as the temporary controlled property or the maker. This 
illu strates how economic strategies can define the fonn of property relations that 
exist with a given abject. In exchange, Trio property relations do not raclicall y 
distinguish between White « conunocliti es » and Amerindian « gift s » or make 
any such simple dichotomy. Rather, they treat property more inclusively the more 
closely related they are to the persons involved, and more exclusively the less 
closely related they are (see Carrier 1998). T his is not the sarne thing as a 
gift/commodity distinction, because it works on a continuum ranging from 
sharing to commodity cxchange. It is effective levels of sociabilit y that count 
rather than « ethnicall y » determinecl categories. 
PROPEnTY IN LOWLAND SOUTII AMERICA 
Testart (2003) argues that theories of prnmtive communism led earlier 
Africanist ethnographers to posit the existence o f communal, ancestral property 
in land, divine and inali enable, which was parcell ed out in usufruct. He shows that 
this theory was based on inconsistent definitions of property and poor inter-
pretation of ethnographie evidence. I f the myth of primitive communism lingered 
in Afri canist anthropology long aft er it was discredited elsewhere, a simil ar myth 
persists in Amazonianist anthropology. Rousseau began a tradition of assuming 
Amerindian societies to be still more primiti ve survivais from before the emer-
gence of property. This tendency has been left unaddressed since the fall from 
grace of evolutionary paradigms in social anthropology, perhaps because it has 
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been overshadowed by structurnli st interest in myth and kinship terminology, 
and by the opposition of Amazonian societies to Western societies. The former 
have been portrayed as icleologically egalit arian, shunning propert y and the 
inequalities it creates (Clastres 1974; Overing and Passes 2000), or as inverting 
Western dichotomies such as that between culture and nature (Viveiros de Castro 
1998). 1 do not wish to cl iminish the achievements of this traditi on, but rather to 
expose the fact that it has left a vast area of study in Amazonian ethnography 
unaddressed, and, more seriously, has perpetuated an ideali sed image of indige-
nous Amazonians as somewhat ephemeral or ascetic beings, unburdened by 
material clesires. Even the proponents of « politi cal economy » style of ana-
lysis 27, such as Rivière (1984) and Turner (1979), failed to develop a theory of 
property specifi c to the region; instead, they imported more or Jess explicitl y 
Marxist-in11uenced ideas of property, while subverting them by emphasising 
the value that nati ve Amazonians give to people rather than objects. Dy doing 
so, they made important theoretical points, but they drew discussion once 
again away from material culture. Even in more « engaged » branches of 
Amazonian anthropology, as in political activism, which focus on problems 
over resources, discourses about land and iutell ectual property rights take 
Western forms of property for granted rather than considering how these might 
appear from an Amerindian perspecti ve, presenting property as a Western and 
colonial « problem » imposed on indigenous peoples, contrary to their « rights » 
according to international law (e.g. Brown 1998; Kambel and MacKay 1999; 
Posey and Dutflcld 1996). Meanwhile, the definition in principle of these rights 
themselves, recently formulated as « indigenous » rights, is not basecl upon 
rigorous ethnographie data 28. 
Hugh-Jones (2009) has recently chall enged the anthropological tradition of 
minimising the signifi cance of objects in Amazonia. As he has argued, there is a 
long-standing tendency in Amazonianist anthropology to focus on people rather 
than things, the invisible rather than the material, and to suppose that persons 
and things come into being through processes of transformation rather than 
creation. By presenti ng the case of Tukanoan ancestor cuits, he shows that 
Arnazonian societies do carry a structural potential for objects to play a key 
central rote, and for creation ex nihilo. Although he does not cl iscuss the question 
of property, its importance is implied in his argument, for the ownership and 
transmission of crafted « heirl ooms » by patrilin eal groups is at tll e core of the 
case he presents. 
Certain received ideas about property are often implicit in Amazonianist 
ethnography. Heckenberger (2005, p. 18) has 110ted the « entrenched view » in 
Amazonian anthropology that Amazonian groups practice « balanced 
exchange »or« reciprocit y » in a « "gift economy" (i.e. lacking " property" or 
other "commodities") ». Indeed, by equating « property » with « commoditi es » 
Heckenberger reveals that his own approach to Amazonian property is far from 
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systematic. T here is plenty of evidence of indigenous forms of property in 
Amazonia apart from those 1 have discussed ; take, for example, the ownership of 
na mes or narratives in central Amazonia (Lea 1995; Hecken berger 2005) 29, or of 
flutes or feather ornaments in Northwest Amazonia (Hugh-Jones 1979) 30. 
Heckenberger (2005) himself recognises the significance of names and types of 
speech as property in Xinguano society 3 1. He catis the act of inscribing social 
memory on the landscape « place-making » (ibid. , pp. 242 ff.), and because of 
Xinguano emphasis on aucestry, ancient plazas « constitute a kind of founder's 
property ... , the fir st-in-liues of ancestral estate » (ibid., p. 290). As 1 have shown, 
although Guianese people do not emphasise ancestry, the relationship between 
foundation and property is the same, and village foundation gives leadership a 
privil eged place in the constitution of property relations. 
Another Xingnano feature shared by the Guianas is the exclnsivity of cer-
tain property relations: in decidiug to create or foster certain relationships, a 
persou often breaks or neglects others, and the creation of new villages and new 
leaders through place-making is often the direct result of a split in another vill age 
(see Rivière J 984). This separation and definition of new entities is greatly 
signifi cant, and the same processes take place on a smaller scale, within the 
kin-based vi ll age itself. 
According to McCallum, for the Cashinahua properly owned items are 
« aspects of the person who owns them ... ». Therefore « food and things may be 
owned absolntely », and everything else, including land, may only have« conno-
tations of ownership ». She adds, rather ambiguously, that this «attitude spill s 
over into » parent-child relations, white asserting that interpersonal relations are 
nevertheless « in no way comparable to relations between persons and things » 
(McCallum 2001, p. 92). Such a categorical assertion cou Id not be made about 
the Trio and Wayana (and McCallum's ambignity makes it unconvincing 
for the Cashinahua). Types of property relations are more nuanced than a 
simple distinction between the ali enable and the inalienable. Food is an obvious 
example: game animais are emphatically not « owned » by the hunier, who shuns 
any spoken reference to his involvement in their death; once brought home, they 
enter a cycle of transactions, starting with the women who butcher and cook, and 
culminating in d ispersal through demand-sharing. According to M cCallum's 
own scheme, it would also be difficult to account for exchanges of objects or 
persons without accepting that persons can in some sense a lso be property, 
because she asserts that « the thing " is" the person »(ibid., p. 93). The difficulty 
with McCallum's argument is that she does not distinguish between human and 
nou-human persons: for instance, even if Trio and Wayana human persons are 
not directly exchangeable for objects 32, they nevertheless constitute one fonn 
of property, and objects (including plants, which may be persons) constitute 
another; the difference is that the exchange of human persons causes a proli fera-
tion of inclusive ties of property and belonging, because it creates kinship 33• 
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M oreover, as we have seen in the case of Akuriyo slavery, huma n persons can be 
owned even if this does not necessaril y mean they are traded. 
Social formations in the Guianas have been described as lacking in the 
complexit y, in both the material and the immateria l worlds, found in other 
regions of Amazonia: vill ages are impermanent and people do not derive their 
identity from a common ancestor; wealth tends not to be accumulated 34• Overing 
(1986, p. 151) claimed that the Piaroa's renunciation of property was at the 
foundation of their egalitarianism: « In the Piaroa view, they have eradicated 
coercion as a socia l o r politica l force within their society by refusing the possibi-
lit y of the human ownership of material resources ». These features of « Jack » 
would appear to suggest that property is unlikely to be an important notion in 
the region, but in fact what they represent is the long-standing tendency in 
Amazonian etlmography to swing between Rousseauesque idyll and savage 
Hobbesian anarchy 35. 1 suggest that these complementa ry poles of caricature are 
based in large part on the lack of recognition of indigenous forms of property 36. 
This tendency cornes partly from observers' insufticient questioning of their own 
assumptions; in the case of property, they did not find in Amazonia something 
corresponding to the codifi ed private property of their own society 37. The 
ideological distortion of Overing's statement quoted above seems to be confir-
med by comparison with ber own evidence in her monograph (Overing 1975), the 
index of which has no fewer than 12 entries under « ownership » referring to 
pages describing features very similar to those of Trio ownership presented here; 
by her own account the Piaroa do not « lack » property at ail. 
Writing about the Trio, R ivière (1969) makes a distinction between « poorly » 
and « well » developed concepts of property. The former are moveable objects 
made from fores! resources, which are readily available to any conj ugal unit. 
The« well developed » fonn, which he notes has important politi cal impli cations, 
is that of women (ibid., p. 41). He places in between these forms certain items 
« such as dogs, exotic manufactured goods, and certain cultivated plants» (ibid., 
p. 42), that is, « property, other than women, which has a n intrinsic value, and 
cannot be replaced by any member of the society out of the resources of the 
environment ».The economic and politi cal importance of these items has greatly 
increased with expanding trade since Rivière's fi eldwork, but the principle 
remains valid , at least insofar as it is more appropriate to d istinguish between 
resources that rely upon relations with other human persons, frequently affin es 
(being obtainable only through exchange) and those that rely upon persona! skill 
(which an indiviclua l can obtain indepenclently), than to distinguish between 
« codifi ed » property and « uncodifi ed » possession . 
As ail this suggests, property has been given piecemeal attention in Amazo-
nian ethnography, but it has rarely been placed at the centre of analysis. A rare 
exception, Vienne and All ard's (2005) account of regimes of ownership of 
intell ectual property among the Trumai, focuses on the« potential for confiict » 
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as a defining aspect of Trumai strategies of excbange, and argues that because 
sharnanic and ritual songs can be passed on without such potcntial, these 
intellectual goods constitute « another order » of property from materia l 
possessions, the former being a type of« bodily transformation». Unfortunately, 
the authors do not tell us more about the« material » order of property. Instead, 
they make a distinction between « objectifying »Western forms of property and 
an indigenous form of« possession » concerned with bodily processes and socia l 
relations. This recalls the distinction between gifts and commodities questioned 
by Carrier and Hecken berger (see above and below). It also resurrects Rousseau's 
distinction between primitive «possession » and civili zed, codified « property » 
which, though inspired by accounts of Carib lndians, was intended as a commen-
tary on modern society rather than as a serious attempt to describe Amazonian or 
«primiti ve» man (Ryan 1986). Besides these problems, it strikes me as unlikely 
that material and «cultural » forms of property can be so neatly distinguished. 
An interesting line of inquiry on the subject of Amazonian property has been 
opened up by Freire who, writing about Piaroa understandings of land rights and 
territoriality, shows that « for the Piaroa the notion of private property is more 
concerned with transformation and continuity in the natural environment than 
with the land or natura l resources themselves » (Freire 2002, p. 2 18). This recall s 
what 1 have argued above, that it is actions and relationships that are important in 
Amerindian rcgimes of ownership and exchange. But it is also important to give 
more attention to the structures of ownership, which 1 have tried to give a sense of 
here, and my understanding of it is in tune with that of Fausto (2008a; 2008b), 
who has begun to look comparatively at the importance of« mastery » in various 
forms across Amazonia (ownership, leadership, spirit familiars ... ) and argues 
convincingly that this demonstrates the way in which inequality, or disequili-
brium, li es at the heart of Amazonian sociality, an argument which resonates with 
my own analysis of indigenous leadership (Brightman 2007). 
PROPERTY AND PROPERTY RELATJONS 
Reccnt work on the anthropology of property bas found consensus in its focus 
on property relations as forms of social relations (Hann 1998, p. 4), specifically as 
relations between persons with regard to things (Verdery and Humphrey 2004), 
with property itself loosely defined. lt has fl ourished in comparative expositions 
(Hann 1998; Hirsch and Strathern 2004; Verdery and Humphrey 2004; Kalinoe 
and Leach 2004; Widlok and Tadesse 2006), characterised by attempts to under-
stand traditiona l or indigcnous fonns of property and cases of contact, influence 
or conflict with European forms in light of one another. Few authors have tried to 
establish a basic, cross-cultural definition of property; instead, most tend to 
emphasise the diversity of forms of property. An exception is Testart (2003), who, 
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in the first of his essays on land as property in Africa, uses the classic jurai 
definition of property as having three basic characteristics: usus, fr11ct11s and 
abusus; thus, to be seen as proprietor of an abj ect, one must be able to use it , to 
enj oy its fruits (when applicable, as with culti vatcd land), and to destroy or 
dispose of it. On this basis, Testart distinguishcs political sovereignty from 
property (as the former does not include use), and shows that the system of land 
as property commonly found across Africa is based on village sovereignty over a 
territory and the right of each « citizen » or member of the community to have 
land to cultivate. Uncultivated land is nobody's property, although it falls under 
the political influence of the village. The sovereign, or local leade1; «shows » a 
piece of land to those who ask for it (new members of the community or those 
who have new mouths to feed), and the latter then appropriate the land through 
cultivatio n. By using the land, it becomes their property; they have the right to the 
products of their cultivation, and they can a lso, if necessary, dispose of the land 
by sellin g it. As I have shown, the Trio's relationship with the fores! environment 
has much in common with this scenario, and the distinction between cultivated 
(or transformed) land as property and a more loosely defined sovereign territory 
is signifi cant. But this sort of characterisation is severely limited by the top-clown 
imposition of Europeanjural cri teria, and cloes litt le justice to the complexity and 
richness of the Trio practices of appropriation that 1 have described. 
A mo re promising theoretical approach is taken by Strathern (s. d.) who, 
writing about anthropological notions of space, landscape, territory and pro-
perty, uses Melanesian examples to a rgue that land can usefully be unclerstood as 
bath a tangible and an intangible resource. Foll owing Corsin-Jiménez (2003), she 
suggests regarding land in various ways in terms of space rather than landscape. 
People in Melanesia can be said to « belong » to the land, as much if not more 
than it belongs to them, and the creations of the land can be seen as creations in 
ways simil ar to the intangible resources of intell ectual property. The nexus of 
relationships between people, land and produce « gives us the rules of exclusion » 
(Strathern s. d., p. 12). What people value in the land is not so much its capacity 
for production, as its capacity for relationships. In this respect, the Trio case is 
similar; relationships and the capacity for relationships are certainly important 
criteria fo r valuing land; although it is somewhat difficult to scparate these 
relationships from the notion of productivity that they in fact imply: the Trio 
value their relationships not only with each othe1; but a lso their ambiguous 
relationships with non-human persans, including the animais and plants, or the 
spirit-owner-masters of those anima is and plants which they consume as food. 
More problematically, at least for comparative purposes, Strathern (s. d .) and 
Corsin-Jiménez (2003) also claim that it may be inappropriate to employ the 
concept of lanclscape to space. I would suggest, fo ll owing Ingold (2000), that this 
distinction makes littl e sense, since few peoples impose abstract cultural mea-
nings on a neutral « space », but instead draw it from interactions with their 
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environment. The Akuriyo, Trio and Wayana rein force places and their meanings 
through shared experience, and they express belonging through situated 
narratives. !tu may th us be represented and experienced, often through interper-
sonal relationships with forest-dwellers (animais and spirits), whereas pata and 
tëpitë (the garden) are transformed as well. This presents some important diffe-
rences with Strathern's Melanesian scenario. In the Guianas, because of the 
clearly differentiated spatial categories that define the relationship with the 
environment, the general concept of« land » is almost meaningless, and still less 
is there such a thing as an abstract and value-free notion of « space ». Space is 
basically either village or forest. The distinction is between cultivated and Other 
(rather than natural), since the forest « belongs » to non-human persons who 
« cultivate » it in their own way 38; it th us corresponds to the distinction between 
consanguinity and aftïnity. In Melanesia, fields belong to lineages and are asso-
ciated with particular ancestors 39. They can be left fallow, and they retain the 
« name » of the group, clan or lineage. In the Guianas, a garden, and even a 
village, only remains associated with ils owner/creator until it is time to abandon 
il and create anew (although the choice of location for a new village will often be 
at least partly informed by considerations of kinship and affinity). Social space 
cannot be taken for granted. Places are historical, and people« belong » to places 
only insofar as they belong to their creators through kinship. For this reason, it is 
impossible to say of the Guianas what Strathern says of Melanesia - that land 
produces people and social groups. 
Anderson (1998) shows how, among Siberian hunter-gatherers, persona) 
aftïnity, sensibility and skill create links to particular places, and « entitlement » 
becomes a part of a « sentient ecology » which « refers to set understandings in 
the reciprocal action between human persons and other 11011-human persons » 
(ibid., p. 75). If property relations are conventionally seen as relations« between 
humans » with regard to things, then Anderson suggests that for the Evenki they 
are Jess anthropocentric and recognise the agency of « other than human per-
sons » (ibid., p. 82). This has a clear parallel in the Trio case, where property, 
instead of a relationship between persons with regard to things, often appears to 
be a relationship between persons (human and/or non-human) tout court. 
Carrier focuses on how property relations are seen to change during exchange 
transactions in Melanesia. He argues that the distinctions between gifts and 
commodities imply « inclusive » and« exclusive» notions of property respecti-
vely (Carrier 1998, p. 86). By showing that, for inclusive notions of property to 
work, actors need to have both the desire and the power to maintain their 
relationship with any given item, and that this does not always ｯ｣｣ｭｾ＠ Carrier 
qualifies Strathern's argument emphasising the « plural and composite ... rela-
tionships » (ibid., p. 89) that produce objects, showing that in Melanesia things 
are not always persons, and thus blurring the distinction between gifts and 
commodities; he reinforces this by suggesting an alternative focus on a distinc-
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tion, or continuum, between inclusive and exclusive property, which as we have 
seen has some resonance among the Trio. Meanwhile, formai rules of who has a 
« right » in something often give way to the effects of persona! influence, blurring 
the practical distinction between power and justice (ibid., p. 97). Carrier thus 
asserts the importance of considering property not only in terms of principles, 
but also in terms of practices. This has clear echoes in the case presented above, 
where ownership and leadership, creativity and control are closely entwined. 
Both Anderson and Carrier note that to understand property cross-culturally, 
it needs to be seen as an aspect of power relations which may be constituted in 
ways which are culturally specific, whether by nature or in their modes of combi-
nation. At the same time, they show that property relations are often determined 
by practice - the result of choices and power relations in particular situations -
rather than by sets of principles. This makes it more difticult to make radical 
typological distinctions between « Western » and « non-Western » societies, 
white making it easier to speak of categories such as property cross-culturally. 
CONCLUSION 
Property exists in Amazonia in a form which is characteristic of the region. 
This form is not radically opposed to Western property, as it has certain points in 
common such as the emphasis on transforming or domesticating the environ-
ment. This fact alone should provide reason enough to base anthropological 
definition s of property on ethnography, rather than on the definitions of econo-
mists or jurists. As for previous discussions of property in the region: it is clearly 
incorrect to claim that Amerindians have eradicated coercion and inequality by 
refusing the existence of property (Overing 1986). If indeed they did Jack coer-
cion and inequality 40, il is not for want of property relations. On the other hand, 
appropriation does not necessarily resemble predation, and is rarely expressed in 
such terms. Property relations as practised in indigenous Guiana are founded 
upon personal relationships (including those with non-human persons), upon 
historical contingency and the narratives that these crcate. They constantly 
change, with certain exceptions, manifested in lasting material objects such as 
railles, bone flutes, feathers and beads. 
A clue for further study on this subject lies in Strathern (s. d.) and Corsin-
Jiménez's (2003) attempt to see land as both a tangible and intangible resource. 
In Amazonia, the relationship between intellectual property and the property of 
land can perhaps be said to be more than just analogous: there is no distinction 
between the two because what ties people to places is knowledge and transforma-
tion, interaction and skill ; in short, what Ingold (2000) calls « dwelling ». Nume-
rous studies have shown the extent of the transformative action of Amazonian 
peoples on their physical environments (e.g. Posey and Batée 1989), and the 
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acknowledgernent of the anthropogenic nature of land may be the key to drawing 
together knowledge and territoriality, intell ectual property and land rights 41 . 
Because they cmphasize relationships - especiall y those of creati vity and 
transformation - rather than things themselves, social networks are of funda-
mental importance to Amazonian property. Strathern (1996) has suggested that 
property cuts and defines networks, giving thern fonn both in the sense of social 
nctworks (networks of people) and of actor networks [which include non-human 
«actants» (Latour 1997)]. In this article 1 have shown how property relations eut 
and define social networks in Amazonia, especially by creating socia l space and 
art iculating relationships between socia l actors. Beyond lowland South America, 
if the fonn of social networks is what we more usually refer to as« society », and 
if property relations give thern this form, then they play a fundamental role in 
social life. * 
• !Vl anuscrit reçu en septembre 2008, accepté pour publication en décembre 2009. 
Noms 
1. 1 developed and wrote this article as boursier postdoctoral at the musée du quai Branly in Paris. 
lt is based upon fi eldwork carried out among the Trio, Wayana and Akuriyo of southern Suriname and 
French Guiana. I gratefully acknowledge the generosity of my hosts there, and the ESRC and musée du 
quai Branly for funding my research. The text has developed through various versions starting as part 
of my PhD thesis (Ilr ightman 2007) and was presented in revised versions at the Séminaire d'anthro-
pologie américaniste at the Maison des sciences de l'homme de Pari s in May 2007, and at the Séminaire 
Branly at the musée du quai Ilranly in February 2008. 1 am gratcful to ail those who have offered thcir 
comments al diflè rent stages, particularly Laurent Berger, Jean-Pierre Chaumeil, Vanessa Grotti, 
Stephen Hugh-Jones, Carlo Severi , Anne Christine Taylor, Diego Vi ll ar and the anonymous revicwers 
of the Journal de la S ociété des Américanistes. 
2. Costa (2007) and Fausto (2008b) are rare exceptions. There have been some discussions of 
property as land rights or traditional knowlcdge in Amazonia (e.g. Brown 1998, 2003; Posey and 
Dutfie ld 1996), but these do not attempt to understand indigenous forms of property. 
3. This tradition, which can be said to have begun with Rousseau (1992 [1754)), finds expression in 
Clastres (1974) and Overing (1986). 
4. As Bell (1998, p. 29) has shown, foll owing Macpherson, the modern Europcan notion of 
« property » devcloped from the sense of a « charaeteri sti c » of a person indicating social positi on 
(e.g. land as an extension of a pcrson in the case of a « man of propcrty ») into the sense of transferable 
rights to things, with the advent of capitali sm. Far frorn showing that the anthropological notion of 
propcrty should be defi ned as « transforable » rights as Bell proposes, 1 would coutcnd that this 
historical transformation demonstrates that Europe devcloped a special case out of an idea of property 
more widely shared among diflèrent cultures and consistent with the etymological origin of 
« propcrty » as rcfcrring to attributes of pcrsonhood (frorn Latinpropri11s, « one's own, special »). 
5. 1 limit the discussion here to verb constructions cxpressing possession, bccause such construc-
tions are used Io make explicit statements about states of possession, and thcy are able to distinguish 
between different types of possession. Parts of speech such as possessive pronouns are of lcss interest 
because they do not distinguish between diflèrent types of possession, and they arc commonly used in 
statements which cmphasise things other than possession itself. 
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6. In the Xingù, effective leaders are also « masters of the vi llage ground » (Menget 1993, p. 71; see 
Hcckenbcrger 2005). Costa (2010 in this issue) shows that the Kanamari associate leadership, 
ownership and, in addition, the body, in one word, which he glosscs as« owner-body-chief », raising 
intercsting questions of scale and self- similar models of relatcdncss. 
7. /t11po11, people/animais of the foresl, have the same characterisl ics cach from lheir own perspec-
tive. An armadill o or an agouti, for example, has il s own pata. Similarly, other peoples such as the 
Cha né and the Ayoreo appear to categorise the en tire uni verse in tenns of property; the Cha né classify 
animais according to their owners (either iyareta masters or humans), and for the Ayoreo ail crcaturcs 
in the universe are owned by one of their seven clans (Diego Villar persona) communication 2008). 
8. See Drightman (2007) for fu rther details on thcse points. 
9. « Les exploitants agricoles pe11re11t bénéficier de co11cessio11s pro1•isoires (5 !ta 111axù1111111) qui, si 
les conditions de mise en mleur sont respectées, deri e1111e11t le11r propriété après 1111e période probatoire de 
5 ans, re11011relable » (Geode 2000, p. 212). ln Colombia, as in the Guianas, tierra baldia can bccome the 
properly of anyone who clears it. ln addition, if it is ali enated from him, the alienator must compensate 
him for his improvements (Stephen Hugh-Jones persona) communication 2006). This highli ghts still 
further that land or space can be occupied, but only its artifi cial transformations can be owned. 
10. See note above, and see « squatting »or adverse possession ri ghts (http://w\vw.propertylawuk 
.nct/advcrscposscssionsquatters.html). 
11. ln some other arcas of Amazonia « houses of transformation » and archctypal houses have 
grcater importance (e.g. Northwest Amazonia, Stephen Hugh-Jones persona! comnnmication 2006). 
Dut evcn hcrc the rclationship bctween people and territo ry is nol nccc.ssarily privil eged on either side. 
Freire (2002, p. 218) gives the intcrmcdiatc case of the Piaroa, for whom «the littl c intcrcst. .. for 
persona! gcncalogies contrasts with their carefu l account of land genealogies ». 
12. By contrast, in Melancsia knowledge of human relationships is as important as the memory of 
who has occnpied which places (Strathern s. d.). 
13. This view, which received il s classic treatment in Rivière (1969), and which is supported by my 
own observations, has bcen contestcd rccently, notably for the Trio by Grupioni (2002). 
14. See llri ghtman (s. d.) for fu rther discusion of this. 
15. A distinction should be made between the« forest »as a category and situational relati onships 
to locations« in » the forest, bccause paths and locations wherc a known event has ta ken place such as 
cutting down a trcc, killin g an animal or gatheringare parli all y sociali sed by the human aeti vity that has 
taken place there. 
16. « Founder » is a very apropriate word to use, as another meaning of e11t11 is the « base [or 
foundation] of a mountain »(Carlin 2004, p. 461). As Rivière (1995, p. 197) puts it, «the tenn e11t11can 
be glossed as "owner" but its scmantie range is wider than that. Il also has the scnse of "origin" or 
" root" , something from which a thing lms spnmg ». Note the simil arit y between the association of 
leadership and ownership here and the same association in fcudal do111i11i11111 (Teslart 2003, p. 5). 
17. See Lévi-Strauss's observation among the Nambikuara that «the leader appcars as the cause 
of the group's willingness to aggregate »(Lévi-Strauss 1944, p. 22). 
18. This recall s the relationships of compadrazgo of the uppcr Amazon, but in this case it is far less 
fo rmali zed and does not carry obli gations. 
19. A tcnth of the size - Tëpu includes about 300 people, and pre-missionary populations wcre 
roughly 30 (Rivière 1984). 
20 .... alt hough a secondary name wi th a topographical deri vation was sometimes also uscd. 
21. The Jargcr «vill age» corresponds more closely to the cluster of autonomous settl ements, 
loosely linked by kinship relations, thal Rivière (1984) calls an« agglomeration ». 
22. Similarly, on the Paru de Leste, the vi llages of Apalai and Maxipurimo were founded by rubbcr 
tappers and by the German traveller Manfred Rauschert respcctivcly (Darbosa 2002, p. 124). 
23. See Grotti (2007) fo r discussion of cxlcnded personhood arnong the Trio and Wayana. 
24. Chapuis comments that feathers for the Wayana are lexicall y and conceptuall y « not dif-
ferentiated » from hair [11111/ie (\V), ime (T)). Hair is regarded as « the scat of a power which also 
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links thcm to the person; so, whcn eut, it must be trcatcd correctly or risk harming its wearer; one can 
makc the hypothesis that the samc is trne of the bird fcathers/hairs which, maintaining some of the 
power of thcir previous owners, bring them to thcir ncw wearer; they creatc a ncw identity » (Chapuis 
1998, p. 374; my translation). In additi on to their bcauty, then, il is the vital power of the feathcrs 
that makcs them valuable. 
25. 1 was unable to obtain consistent general information on heirlooms, but the importance of 
fcathers and other ri tuai it ems recalls other are as, such as Northwest Amazonia , where headdresscs are 
among the highly valucd objccts passed on from father to son (Stephen Hugh-Jones persona! conunu-
nication). According to Darbois (1956, p. 51), \Vayana beads and fcather headdresses were buried, 
along with weapons, with the dead. But Damien Davy (persona! conununication 2007) informs me that 
Wayana feather headdrcsses are indeed inhcrited patrilineally. One of my anonymous rcaders oflèrs to 
resolve this contradiction by suggesting that Darbois and Davy may be referring to two separate types 
of headdress: the p11111ali would be buricd and the hame/e and olok inherited. 
26. In Paramaribo, a 111a/1111w1<1 was sold for 3 € pcr cm diameter in 2005. A small 111a/111rn11a 43 cm in 
diamcter could therefore be sold for 129 €,a considerable sum of money in Tëpu. 
27. See Viveiros de Castro (1996). 
28. The Declarntion on the Rights of Iudigcnous Peoples was adopted by the UN general assembly 
on l 3th Scptember 2007 (T\VGIA 2007). See Kupcr (2003) for a controversial critique of the movemcnt 
that has led to this declaration, and Bright man (s. d.) for furthcr discussion. 
29. Here it is worth noting that certain onomasticsystems recycle a fixed numberof na mes to whieh 
they give grcat signifi cance, as a fonn of property, whcrcas others do not (1 am grnteful to Diego Villar 
for suggesting this; sec also Taylor 1993). However, 1 do not think tbat it is easy to distinguish clearly 
betwccn the two types in Amazonia. Societies such as the Trio do not have an explicitly fixed set of 
names, but names are not duplicatcd, and there is a tendency to acquire namcs from fo reign peoples. 
30. See Hugh-Jones (2002) for a comparison of these themes in both regions. 
31. Chiefiy na mes and chicfiy discourse are the« property » of primary chicfs (Heckcnberger 2005, 
p. 246), and Hcckenberger refers to these names as « symbolic property » and « inalienable 
possessions» (ibid., p. 272). History it self is rcgarded as the« exclusive property »of the most senior 
chicfs, whose privil ege it is to tell the stories of the cight great chiefs (ibid., p. 286). While these arc 
features of Arawakan societies exhibiting a level of fo rmai hierarchical organisation that is not shared 
by other, relatively egalitarian, societies of Amazonia (Diego Villar persona! communication 2008), 1 
suggest that the diflè rence is one of degree rather than kind. 
32. Descola (2001) argues that thcrc is a general rule in Amazonia of « homosubstitution », 
whcrcby persons are not substituted o r exchangcd for things. However, as Descola (e.g. 2005) himsclf 
would be the fir st to acknowledgc, the diflè rence betwccn pcrsons and things cannot be taken for 
granted. Moreover, as Hugh-Jones (s. d.) has shown, it is problcmatic to take for grantcd that 
Amazonian societies arc nevcr « bridewealth » socictics; there are exceptions to the rule. 
33. The Trio and \Vayana also distinguish between animais and inanimate objccts such as money; 
for instance, meat usually cannot be bought and sold . Yet this does not sccm to be merely a malter of 
whether an animal is a« person », for dogs, which arc ccrtainly « persons », have long bcen routinely 
traded for tradc objects or money. 
34. ln fact, villages have recently become more permanent and certain individuals have bcen 
accumulating objects (see above and Brightman 2007; Frcire 2002). 
35. Western phil osophy and ideologies are continually projectcd on ethnographie subjccts; for 
examples, compare Overing (1986) wit h Rousseau (1992), and Chagnon (1974) with Hobbe.s (1996). 
36. Propcrty being arguably the principal thing that primiti ve proto-societies wcre supposed to lack 
(sce Locke 1988). A notable attempt to addrcss this problem has becn made by Thomas (1982), who, 
wi thout rcsorting to idealism, has directly addressed the question of how Guiancse peoples can achieve 
« order without government ». 
37. lronicall y, Amazonian lndians were quick to recognise forms of property that they cou Id relate 
to among European colonizcrs, and the presence of property institutions in Amazonian societies 
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ex plains why thcy adoptcd these European for ms with such speed in addition to thcir own (Diego Villar 
persona) communication 2008). 
38. See Vi\•eiros de Castro (1998) for the classic expositi on of Amerindian perspcctivism. 
39. lt therefore sccms equally odd to neutralise these as« space ». 
40. See Brightman (2007), in which 1 argue that they do not. 
4 1. The cognitive aspects of plant knowledge may also help to shed further light on indigenous 
Amerindian notions of propcrty, and further investigation of the classification of and interaction with 
the spirit world and the livin g environment should thercfore also be given a central raie in future 
research on the subject - see Lcnaerts (2006) and Brightman (2008b). 
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